It is sixty years to the day when Dr Richard Beeching’s report “The Reshaping of British Railways” was officially published on the 27th March 1963. The report and its effects are still discussed with many opinions to this to this day, often in connection with the proposed reopening of some lines and the actual reopening of Exeter to Okehampton in November 2021. This post is an attempt to offer some, hopefully balanced, thoughts and discussion about the report, with of course a slight Southern perspective.
Dr Beeching was at the time Chairman of the British Railways Board, he is not actually mentioned by name within the report, but it will forever be known as the ‘Beeching Report’ . The report, identified 2,363 stations and 5,000 miles of railway line for closure, 55% of stations and 30% of route miles, with an objective of stemming the very large losses being incurred during a period of increasing competition from road transport, that also had the support from the then Conservative Government Minister of Transport Ernest Marples and had also appointed Dr Beeching in the first place.
It would seem however Marples had a direct conflict of interest between his role as Minister of Transport and the civil engineering road building firm Marples Ridgway (although this firm, contrary to often cited belief, did not win any of the contracts for the motorways that were subsequently built). This firm was founded in 1948 by engineer Reginald Ridgway and the then accountant Ernest Marples, whose shares he “sold” to his wife.
Many of the ex Southern Lines especially in the South West of England, already coined the ‘Withered Arm’ were closed as a result of the report. A few protests resulted in the saving of some stations and lines, but the majority were closed as planned and Beeching’s name is to this day, perhaps wrongly, associated with the mass closure or ‘axe’ of railways and the loss of many local services in the period that followed.
One such line that was included in the report for closure was the Tamar Valley line, however due to the poor road links in the area some of the line was reprieved and survives to this day between Plymouth, Bere Alston and Gunnislake. In fact there is currently a growing movement and support for the line to be reopened north of Bere Alston back to the south end of Tavistock and even through to Okehampton to complete the Northern route to counter the issues sometimes experienced along the ex GWR coastal route via Dawlish.
It is also often lamented, though rose tinted glasses, that the Somerset and Dorset line should never have been closed, however initial discussions about the closure of the line, that cost five times more to run than its income created, started in the early 1950s well before the ‘Reshaping of British Railways’ report included it within the proposed lines to close.
In addition to the main report there were a number of maps included within Part 2 of the report that diagrammatically showed data such as : Density of passenger traffic, Distribution of passenger receipts, Density of Freight Traffic, etc. and of course the main outcome of the report the map of Proposed Withdrawal of Passenger Services. I have reproduced part of a couple of these maps in this post showing the Southern Region area.
Map 9 Proposed Withdrawal of Passenger Services shows the almost total eradication of the ex Southern Railway lines in the South West as already mentioned above, and a number of other lines in the South of England identified for closure. Happily some of these lines have now since reopened as preserved railways such as the Alton to Winchester line that between Alton and Alresford now forms the Mid Hants Watercress line.
Although the Unions at the time released their own version of the report titled “The Mis-shaping of British Railways” a number of facts (although in some cases it can also be argued that the figures used within the report were not statistically strong as only a weeks worth of data of passenger numbers from stations etc. were used) within the report appear compelling, (even though the phenomenal subsequent rise in both car usage and ownership could hardly have been predicted at the time), it is perhaps not surprising that the conclusions reached were so wide ranging.
The report with respect to freight on the railways proposed the move to quicker, higher capacity trains, serving the main routes, transporting greater loads to hubs. Not with the then traditional wagons, that were essentially unprofitable perhaps due to the carriage rate structures inherently set by the Government a hundred years previously, but trains loaded with containers. Does that seem familiar today?
Whilst Dr Beeching is a much maligned name (or in some eyes “Scapegoat”) for the passenger line closure section of the report, the majority of the actual line / station closures occurred whilst Barbara Castle was the then Labour Government Minister of Transport, this despite the Labour Party opposing the closures whilst in opposition. It it is also easy, perhaps, to forget that this report also proposed investment in alternative passenger services such as high speed coaches, that of course never occurred, and that this report dramatically modernised freight on the rail network promoting containerisation and long-distance freight haulage.
Who knows if the current growth and success of the railway network as it stands today would have been possible if some of the harsh decisions as a result of “The Reshaping of British Railways” were not taken…
Thank you for an excellent and informative post on the ‘Beeching’ report – a copy of which sits on my bookshelves.
So often talked about (frequently lambasted) but I always wonder how many have read the report during the last six decades…
I agree, many whilst having an opinion of an opinion have never read the full report or put it in context with the politics of the time.
Hi Graham like so many railway enthusiasts this day and age I have never read Dr Beeching report, but I would if I could. I would like to know more behind the report itself as I also think that if the heritage railway world took a fresh view of the report there would be better lines and projects being open
That’s a fairly balanced precis of affairs, Graham. History had definetely scapegoated Beeching for the closures but he was actually a public servant working under instruction and delivered the report that fell within the remit set out by his masters at the Ministry of Transport. I think it’s also fair to say that some lines, such as the North Cornwall, were so poorly patronised by the mid-sixties that it would have been difficult to justify their retention even just for their social benefit to the local community. Many people were no longer happy to walk two or three miles to their local station by the mid-sixties.
I think there are a couple of other points worth mentioning. It was not all about the”Reshaping”: across the country many closures had already taken place before 1963 and some lines, such as the Withered Arm, the Somerset and Dorset and the Great Central main line from Marylebone, were deliberately run down over a period of time with poor timetabling and through and connecting services being removed to make them unviable. However, I do believe that old pre-nationalisation ‘rivalries’ played a part in some decisions: closest to home was the drastic demotion of the Southern main line between Salisbury and Exeter to a long, poorly served branch line, which I’m fairly sure was done for more than just economic reasons and there were many more examples right across the country.
Closures were fewer in the south and south-east than elsewhere and, perhaps because of the greater availability of alternative services, it wasn’t generally evident in the south just how London-centric many of the closures were: lines were closed basically because they were considered to duplicate other routes to the capital and the thinking at the time seems to have been that only one route from each area was needed; little or no consideration was given to the more local needs. The damage done by this thinking was to cut off swathes of the country from accessing not only London but major regional centres. In the West Country, the GWR route eastwards was considered to be all that was needed but closing the former Southern Railway lines cut off North Devon/ Cornwall not only from London but also from Exeter and Plymouth, which cities would have been more important to local residents than a through connection to Waterloo. A much better example was the closure of the Midland main line from to London to Manchester through the Peak District, a duplication from a Westminster point of view in London eyes which was viewed as unneccessary with the ongoing electrification of the LNWR route from London. The effect of the closure was to sever direct railway communication between the whole of the East Midlands, including the cities of Leicester, Nottingham and Derby, and parts of East Anglia to Manchester, Liverpool and the north-west. The ‘alternative’ routes offered were simply not reasonable options for most people: there are still no road or railway alternatives today without accepting major detours.
With hindsight it’s easy to see that swift growth in road traffic following the “Reshaping” closures and the loss of the ‘replacement’ buses services following the deregulation of the bus industry has led to the often intolerable chaos on the roads today. In the long run the consequences of the “Beeching cuts” have led us back to the current, growing demands for reinstatement of many of the lines closed on the recommendation of the doctor. Irony indeed!
As someone living on the Kent / Sussex border I often think that by the logic of the report some of the lines that shut were not that badly used and the statioms made a relatively good amount of money. Oddly enough the section of the Medway Valley Line south of Maidstone seemed to be fairly unviable passenger – wise, though carries a bit of freight, yet survived Beeching. Today it is quite well used. The Hastings – Rye-Ashford line survived but not the Lydd branch. Obviously the Sevenoaks – Tunbridge Wells – Lewes – Brighton service should never have gone and today would be very well-used given the growth of Uckfield and Crowborough. I wonder about the Cuckoo and East Grinstead High Level routes too.
There are lies, damned lies, and then statistics.
I speak as someone whose job before retirement was to assess statistical effects of RCTs for the NHS. I have no doubt that the statistics assembled for the Beeching Report were factually accurate, what I have a problem with is the interpretation of what they meant.
The fact that Beeching was involved with Marples is enough of a red flag on its own. But, that said, British Rail needed to stem the losses.
Arguably, hey this is 60 years after the event, with hindsight at maximum, the focus should not have been so much on line closures, but rather operational efficiencies.
That would’ve meant staff cuts, but also changes in operations and equipment. Wagon designs for one, containerization (obviously), and draft gear (couplings) along with air brakes.
I was around in the days of Lord B. In subsequent years, as an accounting professional, I could see the inadequacy of the statistics collected and quoted at the time. I have doubts over their accuracy and reliability as regards subsequent interpretation and decision support. Accounting methodology was both overly simplistic and skewed to produce the desired result. The mindset was mostly about cost-cutting, although some bright ideas for growth were indeed promulgated.
You’re right about where the focus should have been, but railway management back then was inadequate in a changing world (along with management everywhere).
Mike O’